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Abstract: Allusions to the "decentred subject" can be found in a growing number of educational 
texts. Yet many of these texts say little about the term's meaning or genesis. What exactly is 
the "decentred subject"? what distinguishes this postmodern subject of language from the 
modern subject of consciousness it seeks to displace? what are the implications of the decentred 
subject for modern pedagogies based on the transference of knowledge? This presentation wM> 
trace the origins of the "decentred subject" to 17th Century European thought, drawing upon &e 
work of Lacan and a number of his commentators to elucidate its distinctive features, highlight 
its distinguishing factors, and investigate its revolutionary implications foJ| th^field of> 
education. 
What is unique about the "I" hides itself exactly in what is u^jpffaginable about a person. All 
we are able to imagine is what makes everyone like everyone else, what people have in 
common. The individual "I" is what"differs from the common stock, that is, what cannot be 
guessed at or calculated, what must fa^tatitarijed, uncovered, conquered. 
^Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being 
Three Impossible Professions 
|o FreM, there are three "impossible" professions, three spheres of 
endeavourmat guarantee unsatisfying results, even before engaging in them: 
x^edu^ting, healing, and governing. This did not, however, deter Freud from 
^^eVbting the grea^st j>art of his life to healing and educating. Jacques Lacan, if not 
Freud's most notable, then certainly his most controversial disciple, has argued that 
Freud, despite such misgivings, believed he could make a positive contribution to 
the professions of healing and educating because of a discovery whose full impact is 
yet to be felt. This discovery, according to Lacan, was that of the unconscious and its 
corollary the "decentred subject," a find whose implications are no less 
revolutionary for humanity than that of Copernicus: "it was in fact the so-called 
Copernican revolution to which Freud himself compared his discovery, 
emphasizing, that it was once again a question of the place man assigns to himself at 
the centre of a universe" (Lacan, 1977, p. 165). 
Allusions to the decentred subject can be found in a growing number of 
education texts, especially those focusing on the problematic of identity formation— 
Britzman's (1991) Practice Makes Practice, for instance. Yet while such texts employ 
the notion of the decentred subject to challenge the assumptions of pedagogies based 
on the unproblematic transmission of knowledge from teacher to student, few 
expand on the origins or nature of the notion itself. What exactly is the "decentred 
subject"? what distinguishes this postmodern subject of language from the modern 
subject of consciousness it seeks to displace? what are the implications of the 
decentred subject for modern pedagogies based on the transference of knowledge? ' 
This paper traces the emergence of the "decentred subject" through its formulation-, 
in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to its origins in the Freudian coipu||, dewing • 
upon the work of Lacan and a number of his commentators ^^ucidkte its' 
distinctive features, highlight its distmguishing factors, andfciv^tigate i t/ 
revolutionary implications for the field of education m § 
«# 
Reading Lacan 
Lacan, who aspired first and foremost, to be a Freujstln liked to present his work 
as a rebus or puzzle, not unlike a|||Eeam that demands deciphering before its inner 
kernel of meaning is revealed. Wmting, for Lacan, is "a factor that makes possible 
the kind of tightenj^^pthat I li^in€rder to leave the reader no other way out 
than the wav j^11/ wrdl|||^refer t o ° e difficult" (Lacan, 1977, p. 146). It is, Muller and 
Richardagrfti982, p. 3»ggest , as if Lacan 
- not ol|||explica^s the unconscious but strives to imitate it. Whatever is to be said about the 
mtive^ca|fc-3|:lja'can's mind that finds this sort of thing congenial, there is not doubt that the 
elusive-allusive-illusive manner, the encrustation with rhetorical tropes, the kaleidoscopic 
erudition, the deliberate ambiguity, the auditory echoes, the oblique irony, the disdain of 
logical sequence, the prankish playfulness and sardonic (sometimes scathing) humor—all of 
these forms of preciousness that Lacan affects are essentially a concrete demonstration in verbal 
locution of the perverse ways of the unconscious as he experiences it. 
And while it is now a commonplace that Lacan's reading of Freud is coloured by the 
understanding of Hegel he developed as a consequence of attending Alexandre 
Kojeve's seminal Sorbonne lectures of the 1930s—lectures attended by the likes of 
"Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, Bataille, Queneau, and a host of existentialists, 
Catholics, Communists, and surrealists who eagerly awaited the event of Hegel's 
epiphany" (Pefanis, 1991, p. 11)—it is sometimes forgotten that "Kojeve's 
understanding of Hegel was indebted to Heidegger" (Pefanis, 1991, p. 3). It should 
come as no great surprise, then, that when Lacan, the enfant terrible of 
psychoanalysis, sets forth to unearth the origins of the decentred subject, he follows 
in the footsteps of Martin Heidegger, who traces the emergence of the modern 
subject—the self-conscious, autonomous monad that exists prior to and 
independent of the objects of experience—to 17th Century France, where "Descartes 
found his 'unshakeable foundation of truth' in the subject's awareness of himself in 
the very process of his own thinking/doubt'' (Muller & Richardson, 1982, p. 167). 
A Genealogy of the Subject 
Lovitt (1977, p. xxv) informs us that for Heidegger, "the work of Descartes, itseE 
an expression of the shift in men's outlook that had already taken place, set for"lh 
that basis in philosophical terms." According to Heidegger, it was "inAg,ego cogito i 
(ergo) sum of Descartes" that "man found his self-certainty within hl^isdf/' where 
"man's thinking... was found to contain within itself the nej^ SM. surenlls.1-From 
this point on, "man could represent reality to himself," he cl^^^set it up over 
against himself, as it appeared to him, as an o&/ecf^«hought. TbJI meant that "he 
felt assured at once of his own existence and of the ex«ence of the reality thus 
conceived." It is the epistemology of Descartes, Heide$gpirC1977, pp. 126-127) argues, 
that makes the modern conceptid^^cience—"science as research"—possible. This 
new mode of knowledge, "knowi|g, as research, calls whatever is to account with 
regard to the way in-Wni^ h and th^xtlnt to which it lets itself be put at the disposal 
of representation." Tiik^distinctively modern way of knowing "has disposal over 
anythin^fiat is whenHf^ can either calculate it in its future course in advance or 
verify a|f|dculation about its past." Consequently, "nature and history become the 
"objects ol a representing that explains..., [but] only that which becomes object in this 
way is—is considered to be in being." Heidegger's point is that "we first arrive at 
^^cj^ee a s research when the Being of whatever is, is sought in such objectiveness": 
This objectifying of whatever is, is accomplished in a setting-before, a representing, that aims 
at bringing each particular being before it in such a way that man who calculates can be sure, 
and that means be certain, of that being. We first arrive at science as research when and only 
when truth has been transformed into the certainty of representation. What it is to be is for the 
first time defined as the objectiveness of representing, and truth is first defined as the certainty 
of representing, in the metaphysics of Descartes. (Heidegger, 1938, in Heidegger, 1977, p. 127) 
It is with the advent of modernity, then, that "man, once concerned to discover and 
decisively to behold the truly real, now finds himself certain of himself; and he 
takes himself, in that self-certainty, to be more and more the detenrdning center of 
reality" (Lovitt, 1977, p. xxvi).1 
It is Descartes, however, who is "the originator of the modern notion that 
certainty is the child of reflexive clarity, or the examination of our own ideas in 
abstraction from what they 'represenf " (Taylor, 1987, p. 469). With Descartes, the 
traditional notion of subject—"that-which-lies-before (for the Greeks, that which 
looms up, e.g., an island or mountain)..., the reality that confronted man in the 
power of its presence" (Lovitt, 1977, p. xxvi)—was radically transformed. Descartes, 
Lovitt (p. xxvi) notes, "fixed his attention not on a reality beyond himself, but •  --. 
precisely on mat which was present as and within his own consciousness." In thi& 
act lies the origin of the modern subject, for "at mis point self-conscic||srif|s became 
subject par excellence, and eveiything that had the character^g^ubjecW^yiat-
which-lies-before—came to find the locus and manner of itAeii|j| precise^ in that 
self-consciousness," that is, A , 
in the unity of thinking and being that was established by Docartes in his ego cogito (ergo) 
sum, through which man was continually seeking to make himsjif Ifecure. Here man became 
what he has been increasingly throughout our modern period.rte became subject, the self-
conscious shaper and guarantor of a|ii|i&at comes to him from beyond himself. (Lovitt, 1977, 
p. xxvi) 
Representing the \, j >^ 
It wasjfrtle proce%$pf thinking, then, that Descartes recognized his own 
awarenils of himself, his self-consciousness. This act of reflection involves, "over 
t5tl|d aboV^the registration and perception of sensations, an apperception: an act of 
| attributing'perception to an underlying perceiver" (Grosz, 1990, p. 35, emphasis 
1 added). Hence Descartes' dictum: Cogito ergo sum; I think, therefore, I am. It was 
Tnis revelation that prompted Descartes to declare consciousness and subjectivity 
coterminous. It is exactly this notion of the unitary, centred subject that Freud's 
discovery of the unconscious undermined, however, revealing that "the very centre 
of the human being was no longer to be found at the place assigned to it by a whole 
humanist tradition" (Lacan, 1977, p. 114). But it is Lacan who rephrases the question 
first posed by Freud in a way that is more in keeping with theories of language and 
1 See Briton (in press) for an extended discussion of the emergence of modernity and the modern subject 
and their implications for educators. 
visual perception—de Saussure's linguistics, and Lorenz's and Tinbergen's 
Gestalten—that postdate Freud's own work: 
Is the place that I occupy as the subject of a signifier [in Lacanese, the enunciated subject] 
concentric or eccentric, in relation to the place I occupy as subject of the signified [the subject of 
enunciation]? (Lacan, 1977, p. 165) 
The full implication of this rather cryptic statement will become clearer as we 
proceed. 
Subject as Signifier 
Lacan's answer to the above question is, of course, eccentric or "decentred," osince 
he is convinced that "if we ignore the self s radical ex-centricity to itself with which -
man is confronted, in other words, the truth discovered by Freud, welihlllfalsify ^  
both the order and methods of psychoanalytic mediation...: thg^etter alillejl as the 
spirit of Freud's work" (Lacan, 1977, p. 171). Following Freum,L|||n contends that 
the subject occupies different places or locations: o^^he reaffisb||"signifiers," of 
conscious discourse; the other of "sigrdfying meoia^mns," of 1ne unconscious that 
shapes the "signified" and can, therefore, be designatejpe^timately as thought. 
Since this means "the speaking s^^ct is emphatically decentred in relation to the 
ego" (Boothby, 1991, p. 112), Lacan^i^poses a reformulation of Descartes' Cogito: 
I think [on an uncoB^ou^|evel, at th|J.evei of the "signified,"] where I am not [that is, on a 
conscious level, at the levla of the "siglrifier"], therefore I am where I do not think" (Lacan, 
1977, p.J£6& 
What Dl&eartes fails to'recognize, according to Lacan, is that the concept "I" must be 
imderstoo4;as^ sign" comprised of not one but two elements, elements that 
correspond to Ferdinand de Saussure's (1983) "signifier" and "signified," to the 
matc¥ial and immaterial elements that comprise each and every sign, to the sign's 
extramental and intramental objects. 
Saussure's Sign 
While it was Saussure (1983) who first argued that the relation of the material 
signifier to the immaterial signified, of word to thought object, is arbitrary—that is, 
established through convention rather than through some natural or preordained 
connection—it was Lacan who took up and extended Saussure's metaphor of "two 
floating kingdoms" to introduce the possibility of slippage between the two 
domains, arguing vehemently for "the notion of an incessant sliding of the signified 
under the signifier" (Lacan, 1977, p. 154). In placing the signified below the signifier, 
Lacan privileges the sign's extramental, material object over if s intramental, 
immaterial object. Lacan then represents the "subject of the signifier," the ego • 
subject of consciousness, that which is enunciated through and in language, with 
the matheme "S"; the "subject of the signified," on the other hand, thj| sm^ect of <the 
unconscious, that which structures enunciation, is designated^ with tn^llii|fheme 
"s" . 2 For Lacan, the crucial point that must not be overlooked.is ^iat "the-lfand the s 
of the Sausserian algorithm are not on the same le|^' (Lacan,-19-77, p. 166). 
According to Lacan, the individual's introductfon^ito langifage is the condition 
for the possibility of the modern subject, for the subje^^tbility to "unknowingly" 
represent its own desire to itself.^is "in the unconscious, excluded from the system 
of the ego, that the subject spealssTf {f&can, in Boothby, 1991, p. 111). As Slavoj Zizek 
(1992, p. 68) notes: "^ h.<^^canian ^tio^ac the imaginary [enunciated] self... exists 
only on the basis 6^|^ejliisrecogm&on of its own conditions; it is the effect of this 
misrecogn|€o%." It isV&t, however, the supposed inability of this self to reflect that 
Lacan f||uses on, "on ixs being the plaything of inaccessible unconscious forces; his 
<#$tjmt isHtiat the^bject can pay for such reflection with the loss of his [or her] 
if ontological consistency." 
2 In his Inaugural Lecture to the College de France, Foucault (1970, in Foucault, 1984, p. 108) explicitly 
addresses his desire to assume the unproblematic position of the spoken subject—the enunciated subject, 
the subject of the signifier—rather than the highly problematic position of the speaking subject—the 
subject of enunciation, the subject of the signified: 
I wish I could have slipped surreptitiously into this discourse which I must present today, and into the ones 
I shall have to give here, perhaps for many years to come. I should have preferred to be enveloped by 
speech, and carried away well beyond all possible beginnings, rather than have to begin it myself. I should 
have preferred to become aware that a nameless voice was already speaking long before me, so that I 
should only have needed to join in, to continue the sentence it had started and lodge myself, without really 
being noticed, in its interstices, as if it had signalled me by pausing, for an instant, in suspense. 
Enunciated versus Enunciator 
Misunderstandings of Lacan's position are legend, yet for many commentators 
are readily explicable.3 A failure to grasp Lacan's distinction between the two subject 
positions—between "the enunciated subject" and "the subject of enunciation"—is 
often a source of much confusion. It is useful to bear in mind, therefore, that if the 
unconscious is the locus of thought—the subject of enunciation—and the conscious 
subject is the locus of language—the enunciated subject—an irremediable gap 
between what is meant and what is said becomes apparent "Lacan's point is simply 
that these two levels never fully cohere: the gap separating them is constitutive?1 &te 
subject, by definition, cannot master the effects of his speech" (Zizek, 1994, p. 13VJI is 
for this very reason that "the implications of meaning infinitely exce&d th& signs * -
manipulated by the individual. As far as signs are concernecL^ian is always 
mobilizing many more of them than he knows" (Lacan, in f^jLtrJI^, 1987, pp. 95-96). 
Consequently, the unconscious, the subject of eAnciatiort^fs |i site of unmeant 
knowledge that escapes intentionality and meani^g,\ppearing to the conscious 
subject only in the form of verbal slips and dream imlpfes*—it is a speaking 
knowledge that is denied to the s^^er's knowledge. As Boothby (1991, p. 126) 
notes: "the tendency of discourse|ta evoke a multitude of meanings—what might be 
called the essential 'e^^agance'^lsj^cli—establishes the capacity of language to 
accommodate unco^^io^s mtentftmality even in the most apparently mundane 
and innoc^^banter'^ Sius, we witness "in the "multiple reverberations of meaning 
generatp| within the symbolic system as a whole by the signifying chain... what 
^Lacan ca|ls the ^ centering of the subjecf." The unconscious, then, can be 
characterized' as "knowledge that can't tolerate one's knowing that one knows," and 
3 Metz (1982, p. 223), for instance, suggests that Lacan's "Ecrits make no claim to didactic clarity, at 
least in the ordinary sense (because I think they possess another kind of clarity, profoundly didactic in 
its own way: blindingly so, to the point that the reader represses it and makes enormous efforts not to 
understand)." Of Lacan's elusive, protracted style Boothby (1991, pp. 16-16) declares: 
The difficulty of Lacan's style is not wholly unintentional. Convinced that the curative effect of analysis does 
not consist in explaining the patient's symptoms and life history, convinced, that is, that the analyst's effort 
to understand the patient only impedes the emergence of the unconscious within the transference and that 
what is effective in analysis concerns something beyond the capacity of the analyst to explain, Lacan's 
discourse is calculated to frustrate facile understanding. His aim in part is to replicate for his readers and 
listeners something of the essential opacity and disconnectedness of the analytic experience. Often what is 
required of the reader in the encounter with Lacan's dense and recalcitrant discourse, as with that of the 
discourse of the patient in analysis, is less an effort to clarify and systematize than a sort of unknowing 
mindfulness. We are called upon less to close over the gaps and discontinuities in the discourse than to 
remain attentive to its very lack of coherence, allowing its breaches and disalignments to become the 
jumping-off points for new movements of thought. 
it is psychoanalysis that "appears on the scene to announce that there is knowledge 
that does not know itself, knowledge that is supported by the signifier as such" 
(Lacan, in Felman, 1987, p. 77). 
The point that should not be missed here is that the very condition for the 
possibility of conscious knowledge is the active repression of some other knowledge 
on an unconscious level.4 Ignorance is not the absence of knowledge but the 
negative condition for the possibility of any positive knowledge: the gap between 
knowing and not knowing, consequently, can never be closed. As Felman (1987) 
notes: 
thas -
Ifjgxhaust *• 
there can be no such thing as absolute knowledge: absolute knowledge is 
exhausted its own articulation, but articulated knowledge is by definition what 
its own self-knowledge. For knowledge to be spoken, linguistically articulated, it^g^. s...... 
constitutively have to be supported by the ignorance carried by langu^gef^^ ignorancejSf the 
excess of signs that of necessity its language—its articulation—"mobmesPKFelman,«€V87, 
pp. 77-78) - W f 
Implications for Education 
Of the few who have attempted to investigate the Implications of the decentred 
subject for pedagogy, Felman (1987) offers the most perspicuous account. She notes, 
that not unlike Plato, pgrhaps m&jpftbstlpninent pedagogue in the Western 
tradition, Freud is*#mvili:ed mat bleaching is impossible. She asks us to consider, 
however, w5h#her thMclaim does not constitute a lesson in itself, noting that while 
Freud d|| not formulatjjlf^ychoanalysis explicitly as a pedagogical practice, Lacan, 
^nquestlj^ably Freud's most controversial disciple, views psychoanalysis very 
much throi2glh?a>pedagogical lens. Unfortunately, Lacan's pedagogical project is often 
misrepresented or misconstrued due to certain misconceptions regarding 
critical position. 
4 It is for this reason that Foucaulf s notion of the subject, the subject produced through the process of 
subjectivization, must be dismissed as lacking. According to Foucault (1982)—see also his account of 
Bentham's Panopticon in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977)—the subject is totally 
determined by the apparatuses of Power. That is, the only knowledge the subject possesses is that 
which the apparatus instills in her or him. This, however, overlooks the fact that the condition for 
the possibility of knowledge is the negation of some other knowledge that must remain hidden to and 
from the subject of subjectivization. The subject, in fact, can never be totally determined by or 
transparent to the apparatuses of Power, as is confirmed by the ongoing resistance of subjects to the 
System, despite the best efforts of the mechanisms of Power—for Althusser (1971), "Ideological State 
Apparatuses"—to quell such resistance. See Copjec (1989) for a closer analysis of the important 
differences between structuralist and psychoanalytic accounts of the subject. 
Lacan's critique of pedagogies based on the simple transmission of knowledge is 
often simply rejected as an ant/pedagogical stance—as a desire to forget pedagogy, to 
give it up as an inconsequential practice that seeks only to undo what has been 
established through education. But as Felman (1987, p. 72) notes, this reductive 
conception of Lacan's pedagogical stance as simply anti-pedagogical "fails to see that 
there is no such thing as an anti-pedagogue: an anti-pedagogue is the pedagogue par 
excellence." In fact, both Lacan and Freud viewed pedagogy—in their case the 
education of analysts—to be of the utmost importance. 
The Effects of Language 
Misconstruals of Lacan's pedagogy tend to result from a failure to rejglhis explicit 
statements about pedagogy as "utterances"—as action statements tha^ee^iot only 
to describe something but also to bring something about. m feeing 61Pth|f 
"locutionary" and "illocutionary" dimensions of Lacan's st^e^^its—on4ne 
meaning and apparent intent of his words—such |j|||dings ovirl]pk the 
"perlocutionary force" of his statements—the effict^^wishes to* invoke in the 
listener. Unlike the locutionary and illocutionary aspeijjjj^ of language, whose aims 
are open and can be discerned readily from statements themselves, the 
perlocutionary aspect is necessanl> masked, since its meaning is a function of the 
speaker's desire to achieve a Wdd|j^ gojP©r effect. If, for instance, a speaker wished 
to invoke fear in hef listener, for fpiatever reason, she could not simply declare "I 
want to fripjujt^ n you,t lo do so would strip the utterance of its perlocutionary force. 
Lacan, intact, through^s?own practice, was constantly exploring how what 
j^ychoasikrysis teaches could be most effectively taught, and is renowned for 
dlliberatel^.Attiring linguistic conventions to create effects that extend far beyond 
the manifest meaning of his statements. For Lacan, pedagogy entails much more 
trpifthe mere statement of facts: "it is an utterance. It is not just a meaning: it is 
action; an action that itself may very well at times belie the stated meaning," a 
process of learning that proceeds "through breakthroughs, leaps, discontinuities, 
regressions, and deferred action" (Felman, 1987, pp. 74-76). 
In recognizing that psychoanalysis gives access to knowledge otherwise denied to 
consciousness, Lacan views it as a way of discovering that which can be learned in 
no other way. While traditional pedagogy, on the one hand, is based on a vision of 
intellectual perfectibility—on the premise that learning is a cumulative process, on 
the assumption that the gap between ignorance and knowledge can be fully closed; 
psychoanalysis, on the other hand, reveals that "the radical heteronomy that Freud's 
discovery shows gaping within man can never again be covered without whatever 
is used to hide it being profoundly dishonest" (Lacan, 1977, p. 172). All attempts to 
close this gap through progressive mastery are exposed as futile, because there is 
knowledge that does not know itself, because meaning infinitely exceeds the signs 
manipulated by the individual, because the subject of speech is always mobilizing 
many more signs than she knows. 
The Desire to Ignore 
The consequence is that ignorance is no longer the antithesis of knowledge—a 
void to be filled: it is the radical condition for the possibility of knowledge, an 
integral aspect of the very structure of knowledge. 'Ignorance, in other words, is apt 
a passive state of absence, a simple lack of information: it is an active dynamic of 
negation, an active refusal of information" (Felman, 1987, p. 79, emphasl^added): It 
is, therefore, a passion for ignorance, a resistance to knowledge that tefkhfesg, like 
analysis, needs to concern itself with. More properly unders^^^,as a aesirtlto 
ignore, the nature of ignorance reveals itself to be more per&r^^tive than 
cognitive. As with the ignorance of Oedipus, whic^lpDphocles pgrtrays as more a 
refusal of knowledge than a simple lack thereof, igno|||ice represents an 
unwillingness to acknowledge our own implication injlthowledge. That this 
ignorance, can teach us something^that the refusal to know is itself part of 
knowledge, is the truly revolutio|l^^^ight of psychoanalysis; consequently, the 
crucial questions me.pe&^ogue n^st pfeess are: 
Where doesji: resist?'^hfere does a text... precisely make no sense, that is, resist 
interpre|f§ow Where C | Q S | S what I see and what I read resist my understanding? Where is the 
ignor||iee—the resistancj^W knowledge—located? And what can I learn from the locus of that 
ignorance? How can I interpret out of the dynamic ignorance I analytically encounter, both in 
others Md,injny%elf? How can I turn ignorance into an instrument of teaching? (Felman, 1987, 
p. 80) v ~ * 
S 
VTeaeiing, then, involves not the transfer of knowledge but the creation of 
conditions that make it possible to learn, the creation of an original learning 
disposition. To teach, according to Lacan, is to teach the condition that makes 
learning possible. But how does the teacher do this? Through the pedagogical 
structure of the analytic situation. 
The Dynamic of Learning 
In the analytic situation, the analysand/learner speaks to the analyst/teacher, 
whom she attributes with the authority appropriate to one who possesses such 
knowledge—knowledge of precisely what the analysand/learner lacks. This is the 
beginning of what Lacan describes as "transference." As Zizek (1992, p. 56) points 
out, "this knowledge is an illusion, it does not really exist in the other, the other 
does not really possess it, it is constituted afterwards, through our—the subjecf s— 
the signifier's working"; however, the act of transference "is at the same time a 
necessary illusion, because we can paradoxically elaborate this knowledge only by 
means of the illusion that the other already possesses it and that we are only 
discovering it." It is imperative, however, that the analyst/teacher recognize that 
she does not posses the knowledge the analysand/learner attributes to her—the 
teacher's knowledge, according to Lacan, resides only in textual knowledge, 
knowledge derived from and directed toward interpretation. But since each text has 
its own peculiar meaning and demands, therefore, a unique interpretation, suc&. 
knowledge cannot be acquired or possessed once and for all. Analyst/teachers, 
according to Lacan, are "those who share this knowledge only at the ipe^pon the** 
condition of their not being able to exchange it" (Lacan, in Felman, 19cl|^fpi). This 
crucial point bears repetition: ^ % \ 
Analytic (textual) knowledge cannot be exchanged, it has^ii|used—and u£ed in each case 
differently, according to the singularity of the case, accorcUrwtp the specificity of the text. 
Textual or analytic knowledge is, in other words, that peculiaA^pecuic knowledge which, 
unlike any commodity, is subsumed by its use value, having no*lxchange value whatsoever. 
(Felman, 1987, p. 81) 
3$t 
Lacan is singular in hi^^isistencep^f^^wledge derived from the 
analyst/teacher's pf|||flO|jp engagejpents with oilier texts cannot simply be 
exchanged^fh the 3|f||ysand/learner, it has to be used—and used differently, 
accorclirf to the partirijfptfity of the case—to create the conditions for the possibility 
.^learr^p. Ther^ is, however, one very important thing the teacher/analyst must 
know: howw^lgnore what she knows, to suppress what she learned from previous 
engagements with other texts. 
-^^Considering each pedagogical engagement as a new beginning, The 
analyst/teacher, in coming to the rescue of the analysand/learner's ignorance, is 
pulled into ignorance herself. Unlike the analysand/learner, however, who is 
ignorant of simply her own knowledge, the analyst/teacher is doubly ignorant: 
pedagogically ignorant of her own deliberately suspended knowledge and actually 
ignorant of the knowledge the analysand/learner presumes her to possess. To make 
learning possible in this situation, the analyst/teacher must first situate, through 
dialogue, the ignorance—the place where her textual knowledge is being resisted. It 
is from this resistance, the analysand/learner's desire for ignorance, from the 
statements of the analysand/learner that always reveal more than she knows, that 
the analyst/teacher gains access to the unconscious knowledge of the 
analysand/learner—that knowledge which cannot tolerate its own knowing. The 
analyst/teacher must return the signifiers that express this a-reflexive, obfuscated 
knowledge to the analysand/learner from her own nonreflexive, asymmetrical 
position as the subject presumed to know, as an Other. Consequently, 
contrary to the traditional pedagogical dynamic, in which the teacher's question is addressed 
to an answer from the other—from the student—which is totally reflexive, and expected, "the 
true Other," says Lacan, ''is the Other who gives the answer one does not expect"... Coming 
from the Other, knowledge is, by definition, that which comes as a surprise, that which is 
constitutively the return of a difference. (Felman, 1987, p. 82) 
It is to the unconscious of the analysand/learner, to the subject of enunciation, 
that the analyst/teacher must address her question, then; not to the 
analysand/learner's conscious ego, the enunciated subject. Only men||gli|i|ie be 
fulfilling her role as Other. To express the truth, the analyst^^^ier mi l t |frst be 
taught by the analysand/learner's unconscious. By structuraliy pc^upymgsfiie place 
of the analysand/learner's unconscious knowledgeAy makin|^ njjjrself a student of 
that knowledge, the analyst/teacher assumes the cm^wdy pedagogical stance, 
making accessible to the analysand/learner what wou^^©therwise remain 
inaccessible to her. 
Concluding Remarks 
For Lacan, knowlej|g||is alway| alj^ady there, but always in the Other. 
Consequently, a pe^|opl:al stancWf alterity is indispensable to the articulation of 
truth. Kncrpi^ige, t h e s i s not a substance but a structural dynamic that cannot be 
possessed oy any mcHv|ptal. It is the result of a mutual exchange between 
mterlc>cl|prs that.both say more than they know: "dialogue is thus the radical 
:,ctmditionv4f J^roing and of knowledge, the analytically constitutive condition 
through which ignorance becomes structurally informative; knowledge is 
, essjpftially, irredudbly dialogical" (Felman, 1987, p. 83). Knowledge, therefore, 
" "Cannot be supported or transported by an individual. The analyst/teacher, alone, 
cannot be a master of the knowledge she teaches. This means the analyst/teacher 
must do much more than simply invite the analysand/learner to engage in 
exchanges or interventions, she must attempt to learn her own unconscious 
knowledge from the analysand/learner. In adopting this pedagogical stance, the 
analyst/teacher denies the possession of her own knowledge and dismisses all 
claims to total knowledge, to mastery, to being the self-sufficient, self-possessed, 
proprietor of knowledge. 
This, then, is to reject the traditional image of the pedagogue as omniscient, an 
image modelled on an illusion: that of a consciousness fully transparent to itself. 
Based on the discovery of the unconscious, which abolishes the postulate of the 
subject presumed to know, Lacan contends that the position of the analyst/teacher 
must be that of the one who learns, of the one who teaches nothing other than the 
way she learns, of a subject who is ^terminably a student, of a teaching whose 
promise lies in the inexhaustibility of its self-critical potential—this is undoubtedly 
the most radical insight psychoanalysis offers pedagogy. 
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